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Turkey ?Ɛ ?&ŝŐŚƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ&ĞƚŚƵůůĂŚ'ƺůĞŶdĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?: State of Emergency Rule at the 
European Court of Human Rights 
Accepted for publication in the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre Bulletin (2016). 
Darren S Dinsmore, Lecturer in Law, University of Kent 
 
On 21 July a state of emergency took effect in Turkey and the government submitted a derogation to 
the Council of Europe in response to the failed coup of 15 July. There is compelling evidence of 
systemic, arbitrary and indiscriminate violations of the European Convention on Human Rights as 
part of ƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ  ?&ŝŐŚƚ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ&ĞƚŚƵůůĂŚ'ƺůĞŶdĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚKƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?&dP ? ?. This 
article will examine the past approach of the European Court of Human Rights to states of 
emergency and assess dƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐĚĞƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶ and usĞŽĨĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇƉŽǁĞƌƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ?&dP ?.
 
Background 
By the end of the attempted coup, represented by images of discarded ƚĂŶŬƐŽŶ/ƐƚĂŶďƵů ?Ɛ
Bosphorus Bridge, the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara had been bombed, 246 people 
were killed and more than 2,500 wounded. The government declared a state of emergency for 90 
days, pursuant to Art. 120 of the Constitution (drawn up after the 12 September 1980 coup) and Art. 
3(1)(b) of Law No. 2935 on State of Emergency (SEL), on the basis that the attempted coup and 
resulting instability  “have posed severe dangers to public security and order, amounting to a threat 
to the life of the nation ? ?1 Art. 121 of the Constitution enables the Council of Ministers to issue 
emergency decrees during emergency rule, which can be extended for four months at a time (Art. 
3(1)(b) SEL). 
 
The government has used emergency decrees to conduct a widespread purge of persons connected 
to Gülen, the alleged mastermind of the coup.  ?FETÖ ? was previously listed as a terrorist organisation 
by the National Security Council, on 29 April, on account of posing  “ĂŐƌĂǀĞƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽƐƵƌǀŝǀĂůĂŶĚ
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŝƚƐĐůĂŶĚĞƐƚŝŶĞŝŶĨŝůƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƐƚĂƚĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐ ? and seeking to 
overthrow the government or  “undermine or direct the State authority, to create an alternative 
authority, ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐƚŽƐĞŝǌĞƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?.2 The government claims the state of emergency is 
necessary to  “ĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚĞ&dP ?ŝŶĂŵŽƌĞspeedy and effectivĞŵĂŶŶĞƌ ? and has pledged a return to 
normalcy as soon as possible.3 
 
Necessity and Deference 
The notion of Ă ?ƉƵďůŝĐĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶŝŶŐƚŚĞůŝĨĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƵŶĚĞƌƌƚ. 15(1) ECHR requires 
a derogating state to demonstrate the suspension of rights is necessary in the face of an exceptional 
threat. That threat must be actual or imminent, affect the whole of the nation, threaten  “the 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚůŝĨĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? (including security of the population or functioning of state 
institutions), and is such that normal measures or restrictions on rights are inadequate.4 The 
derogation regime presents an inherent risk of entrenchment and abuse of emergency powers 
amidst reduced domestic judicial constraints. The ECtHR has long taken the position that states have 
a wide discretion in determining the existence of a public emergency and what is necessary  “ƚŽĂǀĞƌƚ
ŝƚ ? ?ǁŝƚŚits own role being to supervise the lawfulness and proportionality of measures taken.5 The 




4  ?The Greek Case ? ? ? ? ? ?-23/67; 3344/67) 05.11.1969, goo.gl/PpZaJm, para 153.  
5 Ireland v UK (5310/71) 18.01.1978, goo.gl/cXN0lZ, para. 207. 
ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨƌƚ ? ? ?ŝƐĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ? “ƚŽƉĞƌŵŝƚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞŝƌƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵĨƵƚƵƌĞƌŝƐŬƐ ?, 
and entails considerable deference to states as to the nature and extent of the threat.6  
 
The ECHR jurisprudence strongly suggests the ECtHR would accept the Turkish derogation given the 
nature of violence and disruption to state institutions on and following 15 July, and focus on 
reviewing the duration of the emergency and use of emergency decrees. Nonetheless, a group of 19 
UN experts and three working groups has stated that the threat to the life of the nation threshold is 
 “ĂƌŐƵĂďůǇŶŽƚŵĞƚŝŶƚŚŝƐĐĂƐĞ ? ?7 tŚŝůƐƚĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨ ?&dP ? ?ƐĐƵůƉĂďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞ
attempted coup and ŝƚƐ “ĐůĂŶĚĞƐƚŝŶĞŝŶĨŝůƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐƵŶůŝŬĞůǇƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĐůĂƌŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇĨŽƌ
derogation is surely met. A challenge to the timing of the derogation, submitted to Strasbourg on 21 
July and after governmental authority had been re-asserted, would presumably fail on account of 
the recognised role of the executive and the ongoing need to secure constitutional order. Turkey is 
more susceptible to challenge on the proportionality and scope of measures ƚĂŬĞŶĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ?&dP ?.
 
Permissibility and Proportionality 
In the first instance, there can be no derogation from the prohibitions on the death penalty and 
torture (Art. 15(2)). The suggested reinstatement of the death penalty is something of a nuclear 
option given the likely consequences for Turkish membership of the Council of Europe and for 
European Union accession. There is, on the other hand, a pressing and heightened risk of torture 
due to the effects of emergency decrees that negate the various reforms designed to remedy 
dƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐůŽŶŐƌĞĐŽƌĚŽĨƌƚ ? ?ǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶƐ. Indeed, Amnesty International has presented evidence of 
various practices that would contravene Art. 3, including: beating and rape of detainees, the use of 
stress positions, and denial of food, water and medical treatment.8  
 
Turkey will undoubtedly struggle to demonstrate that all its emergency measures are proportionate, 
i.e.  “ƚŽthe extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation ? (Art. 15(1)). The ECtHR has 
stated in successive cases that derogation does not give carte blanche to states in their choice of 
measures, balanced with the recognition that its own role is  “ŶŽƚ ?ƚŽƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚĞŝƚƐǀŝĞǁ as to what 
measures [are] ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞŽƌĞǆƉĞĚŝĞŶƚ ? ?9 The provision for 30 days detention,10 for instance, 
appears a clear breach of Art. 5 given the need to protect against arbitrary, incommunicado 
detention and torture.11 Turkey will likely be able to satisfy the ECtHR of  “ĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ?12 to 
justify denial of access to a lawyer (for up to five days), but not the observation and recording of 
ĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĞƐ ?ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐǁŝƚŚůĂǁǇĞƌƐ ?13 in only a handful of cases if at all. Routine use of such powers 
would contravene Art. 6. 
 
dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ purge of civil servants and civil society is an extraordinary and rare tactic by a derogating 
state, involving mass detentions and immediate suspensions and closures affecting the judiciary, the 
armed forces and police, education, trade unions and the media. That such measures can be taken 
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƉĞƌƐŽŶƐǁŚŽ “ďĞůŽŶŐƚŽ ?ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚƚŽŽƌŚĂǀĞĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚ ?14  ?&dP ?indicates a lack of 
distinction between coup participation and legitimate criticism or activity. The additional clause 
                                                          
6 A and Others v UK (3455/05) 19.02.2009, goo.gl/iC9gEr, paras. 177-180. 
7 goo.gl/yRkAS0. 
8 goo.gl/JyfHDc. 
9 Brannigan and McBride v UK (14553-4/89), 25.05.1993, goo.gl/e6lyTw, para. 59. 
10 Decree No. 667, Art 6(1)(a). 
11 Aksoy v Turkey (21987/93) 18.12.1996, goo.gl/SojVnI, para. 78. 
12 Ibrahim and Others v UK (50541/08+) 13.09.2016, goo.gl/AtsrJM, paras. 255-265. 
13 Decree No. 668, Art. 3(1)(m); Decree No. 667, Art. 6(1)(d). 
14 Decree No. 667, Arts. 2(1) & 4(1); Decree No. 668, Art. 2(1); Decree No. 670, Art. 2(1). 
ĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞũƵĚŝĐŝĂƌǇ ? “ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽƌƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?ĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?15 is arguably 
beyond the declared derogation. While Council of Europe experts are working to secure ECHR-
compliance of the emergency decrees,16 the removal of 24 Kurdish mayors in the South-east reveals 
the unrestricted use of the derogation. 
 
Conclusion 
It is well established under the ECHR that states can take exceptional action in the midst of security 
crises. dŚĞĂůĂƌŵŝŶŐƐĐĂůĞĂŶĚƐĐŽƉĞŽĨdƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞ attempted coup, however, 
threatens the rule of law and political and social life, alongside the existing human rights crisis 
created by the military campaign the South-east. It remains to be seen whether the Council of 
ƵƌŽƉĞ ?ƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĐĂŶĐƵƌĞƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌĞĐŽƵƌƐĞƚŽĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌǇĂŶĚŝŶĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚĞƉŽǁĞƌƐ. 
                                                          
15 Decree No. 667, Art. 3(1). 
16 goo.gl/TPUJHV. 
